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EDITOR'S COMMENTS 
Justice Scalia introduced a speech printed in the 1989 Duke Law Journal with the statement that "Administrative law is not for sissies," by which 
he meant that it was so dull as to be dangerous. For Professor Brisbin, as 
discussed in his article in this issue, that speech raised important questions 
about not just the ubiquitous "Chevron doctrine," but the direction of the 
administrative law discourse. For me, it raised a more personal question. 
Justice Scalia came to the Court as an administrative law teacher and 
scholar; he was chair of the Administrative Conference of the United States; 
a substantial part of his professional life has been devoted to the subject. Is 
it perverse, or merely macho, that he would have done so if he found it 
dangerously dull? His statement is certainly not extraordinary among the 
rest of us who have taken up administrative law because we would quickly 
second his observation to those outside. Why are we doing this to ourselves? 
Have we, for whatever reason, backed ourselves into this tiresome niche, 
are we such poor creatures that we have no alternatives, do we place some 
special value on dullness, or is there something in this discipline that we 
find interesting, even exciting, that escapes others and that we have failed 
to convey to the uninitiated? 
I do not know which of these my students would ascribe to me, but I 
choose to believe that the reason for my commitment is the last. Adminis-
trative law is interesting, even exciting, to me-which leads to another 
introspective question: Am I bent in some strange way that this should be 
true? The alternative to an affirmative answer to this question is an asser-
tion that administrative law is in fact interesting. Hence I am driven to make 
that case. 
In the last several years, I have been involved in several projects, from 
treatise writing to casebook development to editing this journal, which have 
forced me to confront the question: What is administrative law about? The 
search for an answer to this question seems a fruitful beginning in discern-
ing why it is interesting to me (perhaps us). 
It is not temporizing to observe that administrative law is about many 
things. From the broadest perspective it is about the processes of govern-
ment and, even more generally, human interaction in the pursuit of govern-
ment. It is a legal system that structures the operational liaison among the 
various systems of human behavior related to government. This means that 
it incorporates the type of thinking relevant to rriany intellectual disciplines, 
such as law, political science, economics, cognitive psychology, management 
and more. Administrative law is the vehicle through which the law becomes 
the end-user of the work of these related disciplines. While as we "do" 
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administrative law we are often unable to employ all of these disciplines, 
we recognize that a meaningful answer often involves inquiries represented 
by these disciplines. Isn't that potential eclecticism inherently interesting? 
Superimposed on the fundamental cross-discipline nature of administra-
tive law is the various operational levels at which it affects individuals and 
society. Our study of administrative law has been unsatisfactorily focused 
on American federal administrative processes, but the practice of adminis-
trative law is equally important at the state and local levels. Moreover, 
becoming increasingly important are the administrative processes of the rest 
of the world; these processes have become important to administrative law 
practice and to those of us searching for answers to administrative law ques-
tions (and those with irrepressible curiosity). While adding yet more mind-
boggling complexity to the subject, isn't that reach inherently interesting? 
The excitement of administrative law derives from the contemplation of 
an infinite array of unique, often subtly unique, human logic systems. This 
is the charm of the best science fiction or mystery writing, but here th~ 
diverse systems exist in the real world and impa.ct on the lives of real people. 
Administrative law is puzzle-solving with a stake, investigation of the idio-
syncrasies of the human spirit with consequences. Not everyone likes puzzle-
solving, but if one does then administrative law should hold many charms. 
Administrative law's panoramic vision, however, can also become the 
source of disaffection. Its conglomeration of disciplines and ideas often 
makes the subject seem rambling and incoherent rather than intricate and 
eclectic. Hence, the basic challenge to administrative law as a discipline is 
to evolve techniques for managing diverse concepts and for facilitating 
communication among related disciplines. For these reasons, it seems 
constantly engaged in the rather desperate search for coherence. 
As an enthusiast, it is natural that I should have settled on certain order-
ing devices. I rely on two analytical strategies as applied to the several 
administrative processes: the constitutional and legislative processes for 
empowering the bureaucracy, the internal decisionmaking processes, the 
control processes and the public access processes. One of these strategies 
allows me to order the inquiries regarding the array of substantive areas 
and the other to order inquiries regarding the myriad of different struc-
tures for decisionmaking behavior. These strategies provide the means for 
dealing with the intricacies of administrative law without becoming lost 
among the mass of information and concepts. 
To manage the substantive inquiries, I perceive that administrative law 
has seized on issue categories. These issue categories allow it to capture the 
essence of wide-ranging substantive fields. Using these issue categories, 
administrative law can develop some common understanding and transfer 
thinking among the various substantive areas. The internal procedures for 
factfinding in one area, for example, may be used to evaluate factfinding; 
procedures in another. The delegation of policymaking authority in an 
existing substantive program may guide a delegation for a new program .. 
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Always with recognition of the uniqueness of each substantive field, these 
issue categories nonetheless facilitate communication and borrowing. 
To manage the numerous legal devices for structuring human interaction 
in making decisions, administrative law has evolved universal decisionmak-
ing models. These models evolve from two basic distinctions. The first is 
the familiar distinction between the processes for making individual deci-
sions, "adjudication," and the processes for making group or policy deci-
sion, in the administrative context called "rulemaking." This distinction 
guided the drafters of the Constitution and has long been accepted in our 
theory of government. It quite naturally passed into our theory of the 
administrative process and has become well established. This distinction 
combines with the second aspect of our models derived from comparisons 
according to the Anglo-American trial model. The nature of the independ-
ence of an administrative adjudicator in one program, for example, can be 
used to evaluate the adequacy of the independence of adjudicators in another 
program. Although the dominance of the trial model creates unnecessary 
conceptual boundaries, our legal culture naturally drives administrative law 
toward this mode of analysis and, on the whole, it serves as a useful analyt-
ical device. Using the models derived from these distinctions, administra-
tive law analyzes decisionmaking mechanisms as to whether individual 
adjudication or generalized rulemaking is appropriate and which elements 
of a trial should be employed in a particular program. 
For me, issue categories and generalized models lay a coherent founda-
tion for analysis even if they do not provide final answers. Having thus 
found some means (even if not the best means) for ordering the interplay 
of information and concepts, I find in administrative law an infinite supply 
of intricate puzzles where others might see only a disorganized morass. Thus 
ordered, administrative law then offers me the excitement of the search for 
solutions, excitement enhanced, as suggested above, by the fact that the 
solutions have real-world consequences. All this justifies, for me at least, the 
conclusion that administrative law is in fact interesting. 
These observations about the nature of administrative law also guide my 
mission as editor-in-chief of the Administrative Law Review. The Review should 
be a vehicle for communication among the related disciplines and the Review 
should publish articles from a broad range of disciplines. The range extends 
from substantive expertise to legal theory to tbe operation of individual 
programs. Even though the individual legal fields have their own journals, 
the Review should accommodate an author who wishes to communicate with 
a broader audience about some substantive issue or program. Also, scholars 
in related nonlegal disciplines need the Review in order to communicate 
with the legal community. Therefore, one dominant goal of the Review must 
be to facilitate the exchange of information and ideas among all the compo-
nents of the administrative law inquiry. 
